

1916

L22

Lancaster.

The Ottoman Empire And The Reforms Of
Selim III.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE
REFORMS OF SELIM III.

BY

RUTH LANCASTER

THESIS

FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN

HISTORY

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1916

17 Uc 16 GRAIG

1916
-220

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

May 29 1916

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

Ruth Lancaster

ENTITLED

The Ottoman Empire and
the Reforms of Selim III

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF

Bachelor of Arts in History
in College, Liberal Arts and Sciences

Albert Howe Lybier
Instructor in Charge

APPROVED:

Everts Bruen

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF

History

343165

CONTENTS

Introduction	
I. The Ottoman Empire--Extent and Population	page 2
II. The Government of the Empire	6
III. Conditions Demanding Reform	25
IV. Previous Attempts at Reform	39
V. Reforms of Selim III	45
VI. Opposition to Reforms	52
VII. Results and Outlook	57
Bibliography	59



Introduction

Since the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, when the dread of Turkey as a military power in Europe ceased, interest in this power has been mostly diplomatic and selfish. Various nations have desired to use her as a political machine against the growing power of Russia or Austria, and have made certain attempts to strengthen and reform her organization in order to accomplish this purpose. However, the general desire among the great powers has been to push Turkey back from Europe, and little has been done by them for the real benefit of the Empire. It will be the attempt of this paper to show the true condition of the Ottoman Empire about the end of the eighteenth century; and to discuss the efforts toward reform from within,—the attempts made by the Turks themselves to regain the prestige and power of the Empire,—especially the heroic and much opposed reforms of the Sultan Selim III.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013

<http://archive.org/details/ottomanempireref00lanc>

Chapter I

The Ottoman Empire--Extent and Population

The Ottoman Empire at the time of Selim III covered large portions of three continents. European Turkey included Greece, present European Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and most of the Roumanian country, then known as the provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, extending to the Dniester River on the northeast.¹ This territory, exclusive of the Danubian principalities, was divided into five provinces, or eyalets, Roumelia, Bosnia, Silistria, Djezair, and Crete. These were again divided into various pashaliks and districts. In Asia the Empire included Asia Minor, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and parts of Arabia. This was divided into a great number of provinces, among which ^{were} Anatolia, Bagdad, Syria, Erzeroum, Sivas, Diarbekr, Aleppo, and Van.² In Africa, Turkey held Egypt and Cyrenaica during part of this period, Tripoli was nominally tributary, and Tunis and Algeria were theoretically subject.³

These lands were held with varying degrees of control, corresponding in general to the distance from Constantinople. The Empire might be divided broadly into five classes of territory;⁴ first the body of lands directly administered from the capital, such as Roumelia; second the lands less directly administered and under special regulations, as Kurdistan; third, the tributary pro-

1. Miller: Ottoman Empire.

2. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 314.

3. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 15.

4. Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 28.

vinces, such as Moldavia and Wallachia; fourth, the protected or vassal states, as the Ionian Islands; and fifth, neutral territory outside, such as the territory between the Boug and the Dnieper rivers before the treaty of Jassy in 1792. Turkey was in a period of disintegration at this time; the independence of so many of her provincial governors, the fact that the ruler of Georgia had recently become an acknowledged vassal of Russia,⁵ and the fact that Russia had a right to interfere in the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia are manifestations of this condition.⁶

It is difficult to secure definite information on the population of the Empire. No count was made, and means of estimating are scarce. An estimate quoted in 1817 gives the number as 25,330,000,⁷ but we do not know to what extent this includes the peoples in those areas which were nominally dependent on Constantinople but which were actually independent.

The Empire may have been much depopulated about the end of the eighteenth century due to the great amount of plague and famine.⁸

No such thing as an Ottoman nation had ever been created. Through their churches the Christians had maintained their nationalities apart from their conquerors, and the Turks had made no attempt to mix with their conquered subjects because of their

5. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 310.

6. Russia had obtained this right of interference at the treaty of Kainarji in 1774. Russian ministers at Constantinople were permitted to remonstrate in ~~the~~ favor of these provinces. Article XVI, Sect. 10.

7. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 15.

8. Eton: Survey, p. 290.

intense prejudice against the Christian religion.

The Turks are the the followers of Mohammed who use the language of ^{the} Tatarian conquerors of the countries. They had always been the actual masters of the Empire, and they claimed superiority on the ground of conquest and religion.⁹

The Greeks were the most important Christian people. They had a small compact country inhabited almost entirely by their own group. The Greeks combined an aptitude for business and a love of book learning. Writers about the end of the eighteenth century had very varied opinions concerning the character and the abilities of this race.¹⁰

There was a considerable difference between the Constantinople Greeks and those in Greece proper. Those in Constantinople were especially crafty and fraudulent, and had a superior talent for intrigue. "There is in a suburb called the Phanar, a race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise those of the islands; they are certain opulent families, from which are generally appointed the dragomens of the porte, and the waywodes of Wallachia and Moldavia. . . . They are continually intriguing to get those in office removed, and obtain their places. . . . They are all people of very good education, and are po-

9. Eton: Survey, p. 11.

10. Thornton had a very low opinion of the Greeks, and criticized Eton's strong praises of them. (Thornton: Present State of Turkey). Eton certainly overrated them, but Thornton seems quite prejudiced against all of the Christian peoples of the Turkish Empire. He says of the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia, who were Roumanians of the Greek Orthodox faith, "The modern inhabitants, instead of the rude and hardy virtues which distinguished their barbarian ancestors, instead of the dignified manliness which constituted the Roman char-

lite, but haughty, and vain, and ambitious to a ridiculous degree. . . . They have in general all the vices of the Turks of ^{the} seraglio.¹¹ There were numerous other races, Christian and Musselman, as well as a great number of Jews, scattered throughout the empire. The important Christian races were to be found principally in Europe, and included the Bulgarians, the Albanians, the Roumanians, the Servians, and certain other Slavic races. The Arabs composed a large part of the Asiatic population. North of these were several other wandering, pastoral peoples, such as the Kurds and the Turcomans. They were all an unsettled and generally a plundering people.¹² The principal non-Musselman nations in Asia were the Armenians, who were Christians, and the Jews, who were also scattered throughout Europe.

10. (Continued) acter, retain only a stubbornness in refusing what they know will be wrested from them, an obstinacy in withholding what they dare not defend."

-- Present State of Turkey, II, p. 327.

11. Eton: Survey, p. 331.

12. "The Turcomans are a wandering set of people, who, in the winter months, migrate from the northern part of Asia Minor, and during that period occupy with their numerous flocks, the plains of Antioch. . . . In the same manner as the Bedouins, they are divided and subdivided into tribes and families. . . . The Turcomans are a numerous race of people."

--Walpole: Journeys, p. 339.

Chapter II

The Government of the Empire

The government of the Ottoman Empire was essentially a theocratic absolute monarchy. It was subject to the direct personal control of the Sultan, who was a "temporal autocrat," and the most generally recognized "successor" of the Prophet, and consequently the spiritual head of the Moslem world. The government was neither entirely military nor a theocracy, but had features of both.¹ It was a despotism in that it was founded by force, and upheld by force, but there was also in its authority a certain amount of appeal to reason, "the reason, indeed, of a nation that bounds investigation by the precepts of the Koran."

The spiritual and temporal authority of the head of the government is shown by the titles imam and sultan. These titles are equivalent to Emperor of Islamism, Pontiff of Musselmans, and Protector of the Faith.³ The imam is supposed to be of the tribe of the Koreish, but this difficulty was said to be overcome by the surrender of power by the last caliph, a descendant of this house, to Selim I and his descendants. Submission to the sultan, both as spiritual and temporal chief, was universal in theory though not in practice.

"The theoretical absolutism of the sultan had always been tempered by traditional usage, local privilege, the juridical and spiritual precepts of the koran and its ulema interpreters,

1. Eton: Survey, p. 17.

2. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 88.

3. Thornton: Present State, I. p. 88.

and the privy council."⁴ Authorities differ in regard to the extent to which the sultan was really bound by any authority, but all seem to recognize that he was restrained somewhat by the religion or, at least, by the religious forms.⁵

4. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th, XXVII, p. 427.

5. "It is merely by the koran, or their religious institutes, his sovereignty exists; the moment he abandons those doctrines, or violates those laws, he becomes an infidel, and ceases to be the lawful sovereign. . . . That even the sultan thinks himself bound by law is evident from his practice; for, on any treaty to be made, any war to be undertaken or transgressions punished that are committed against himself, or by persons of high rank in his service, he applies to the mufti for his decree, his decision, or sanction of law."

--Porter: Observations-- p. 88, p. 104.

"Absolute as the Turkish sultans are, they feel themselves circumscribed both by religion, the principle on which their authority is founded, and by the army, the instrument which they must employ."

--Dr. Robertson, quoted by Thornton: Present State, I, p. 93.

But Thornton believes the power of the sultan was little restrained. "The Mohammedan religion inculcates the reciprocal duties to be observed by the prince and his subjects; but, though it teaches, it cannot enforce a just administration of government. The only conditions imposed upon the sultan are the profession of the Mohammedan faith, and conformity to the ceremonial of the Mohammedan church; and although the practice of every regal virtue be more consistent with these duties, yet they are not incompatible with the exercise of the most atrocious tyranny. . . . His power is restricted only in the observance of the religious institutions; for in civil and political matters, the law admits such a latitude of interpretation, that his will alone is sovereign, and is subject neither to control nor censure."

--Thornton: Present State, I, p. 94, p. 110.

The sultan did little actual administrating. He still held a tribunal once a week, but it was of little consequence.⁶ Yet not only the executive but the legislative power essentially resided in the sovereign. Imperial decrees were subject to his revision

6. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 172.

and were in force only during his pleasure.⁷

The sultan had a most arbitrary power over the lives and property of his officers. He might depose and banish the mufti or any other officer, and although the law forbade the killing of any member of the ulema, this had sometimes been done.⁸ The sultan was the lawful heir to all the property of his officers except that of the ulema. He was restricted in regard to the property of others, but it was easy to avoid restrictions, and he often secured wealth by ruining a subject through some pretext or supposed crime.⁹

The matter of succession in Turkey was regulated in a manner quite peculiar to that Empire. The crown fell not to the eldest son, but to the eldest male relative of the sultan, although the relationship might be quite distant. Due to the system of plural marriages there were usually a large number of heirs, and these had always been feared by the sultan. Formerly most of them were killed,¹⁰ but after 1603 the sultan's own sons were shut up in "cages" and carefully watched, although certain other children of royal blood were executed.¹¹

Selim III, as sultan, was probably above the average of his line. He did not have the fierce warlike vigor of many of his

7. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 110.

8. Ibid., p. 130.

9. Eton: Survey, p. 28.

10. "'Sedition is worse than slaughter,' says the koran, and acting on that adage, the sultan of Turkey for centuries provided against revolution by putting out of the way every male heir who could possibly be a candidate for the throne."

predecessors, but he was of sufficient force to stand out from the inefficient, lazy, and cruel sultans of the century. He came to the throne a young man, active in person and energetic in manner, and he was a man of considerable ability.¹²

The other officers of the empire might be divided roughly into three groups: the civil and administrative officers; the doctors of ^{the} law; and the governors and other local officers.

The chief officer in all temporal affairs, both civil and military, was the grand vizier. He presided over the political affairs of the empire, and was restrained only by the will of the sultan, and by the religious laws. He had power of life and death over the subjects of the sultan, but he was bound to observe a certain procedure, and the people, as well as the sultan, held him accountable for the proper administration of the army and home affairs.¹³

Under the grand vizier there was a sort of cabinet, which consisted of the kiaya bey, who attended to the home department and the war office, the reis effendi, whose special province was foreign affairs, and the tchaush bashi, or Lord High Marshal, who was vice president of the vizier's judicial tribunal, and chief of the police force of the capital.¹⁴ Besides these there were

11. "The sultans frequently give in marriage to pashas princesses of the Imperial family; but the male children of such marriages are put to death as soon as they are born"

--Eton: Survey, p. 101.

12. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 294.

13. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 142.

14. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 322.

the nishanjis, or secretaries, the defterdars, or treasurers, and other officers, one of the more important of whom was the Interpreter of the Imperial Divan, who was usually a European, or a Phanariote.¹⁵

The grand vizier presided over the divan, or council of state, which was called on state occasions to discuss measures, and which was supposed by some to be a check on the sultan's power; but it was an advisory body only. It consisted of the great military officers, the heads of the ulema, and the principal ministers.¹⁶

The second group of officers consisted of the "ulema, or body of lawyers, and their chief, the mufti,"¹⁷ or high priest, to whom was intrusted the exposition of the Mohammedan law in all its branches."¹⁸ The mufti was next in spiritual rank to the sultan, who as caliph, was the religious chief of all Sunnite Mohammedans.¹⁹ The ulema was a body of great dignity and honor, and it also was supposed to be a check on the sultan; but it had little actual power. The sultan had to submit certain of his decrees and laws to the mufti, who, with the advice of the other members of the ulema, decided whether or not they conformed with the precepts of the koran; and that gave this officer an opportunity to pass on them. But if his ideas did not agree with the sultan's, the sultan had only to place some one else in his office; and, as all of the members of the ulema aspired to the position of mufti, they usually saw to it that their ideas agreed

15. Lane-Poole: Turkey, p. 327.

16. Eton: Survey, p. 23.

17. The mufti was also called the sheik-el-islam. He should not be confused with the muftis who were the councillors to judges throughout the empire.

18. Eton: Survey, p. 19.

19. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 322.

with those of the sultan.²⁰ The ulema had to consent to all treaties, but the sultan could force them in this also by deposing the mufti.²¹

This group, although they were spiritual chiefs, must be distinguished from the imams, or immediate ministers of religion, who did not belong to the ulema, and whose services were confined to the mosques.²²

The members of the ulema had certain privileges: they were exempt from taxation, and they were the only officers of the government whose property was hereditary in their families. The offices, however, were hereditary in the order only.²³

The third or local class of officers consisted of the provincial governors of varying rank. The greater governments were given to lieutenants called beylerbeys (prince of princes), and the lesser provinces to pashas, beys, and aghas.²⁴ The various divisions differed greatly in size, but the offices were usually unequal in dignity only, not in power. The power of the governors depended usually on their personality, or on the situation of their provinces, or on special circumstances. The governors were not appointed, as formerly, from among the sultan's slaves, who would feel absolute dependence upon him,²⁵ but the positions were now bought, and often held for long periods. This fact was a main source of the degenerate condition of the empire.

20. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 134.

21. Ibid., p. 135.

22. Ibid., p. 122.

23. Ibid., p. 127, 128.

24. Ibid., p. 155.

25. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 4.

The religion of the Turks had such a close relation to their life and their government that it is impossible to survey their political institutions without touching on the relation of Islam to the government. These two institutions touch at every point. The sultan held his power through the authority of the religion, and the government took its form from the same source. (The Mohammedan church recognizes no form of government but monarchy, and admits no division of authority). The law was founded absolutely on the koran and was contained largely in that book; and the foreign policy of the empire was determined largely by the religious prejudices of the people.²⁶

It was in the law especially that the intimate relation between religion and government was shown. The fundamental law was the koran itself, the respect to which was due to its supposed divine origin. From this was derived a code of laws, called the multeka, which related to religious, civil, criminal, political, and military affairs.^{27 28} To these were added certain commentaries called the durer or halebi, and besides these there were various collections of the fetwas or the decrees of the mufti.²⁹ The original theological law contained a few general

26. The Turks sometimes broke treaties with Christian powers and justified this action on religious grounds. But this point has probably been made too much of by such writers as Eton. He says, "The Turks had no respect for treaties made with Christian nations. The ulema is quoted as saying that 'a treaty made with the enemies of God and his prophet might be broken, there being nothing so worthy a Mohammedan as to undertake the entire destruction of the Christians.'"

--Eton: Survey, p. 105.

27. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 107.

28. "Suleiman charged Sheik Ibrahim Halebi with the task of preparing a code; and the result, prepared before 1549, was the

precepts, though it by no means prescribed the form or mode of government in its minute branches; and it expressly conceded to the legislation of the prince an absolute authority on all matters which did not relate to the belief or the practical duties of religion.³⁰ The first caliph took advantage of this to establish the procedure and forms of government and to create the code.³¹

It was not the laws of the Ottoman Empire, but their misuse,--the corruptions practiced under them,--that gained for the empire its reputation for injustice and cruelty.³² The administration of justice, while formally not differing materially from that of some of the more enlightened nations of Europe, in reality was despotic, arbitrary, and, at least from the point of view of the Christian, unjust.

The hakim, or departments of justice, were divided into the

28. (Continued) Multeka ol-ebhar, which remained the foundation of Ottoman law until the reforms of the nineteenth century."

---Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 153.

29. Eton: Survey, p. 30.

30. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 110.

31. "The Koran, containing political institutions as well as religious dogmas was probably sufficient to regulate the civil affairs of Mohammed's first followers. . . . But when they became more numerous, and their dominion was spread over many opulent and extensive regions, . . . law digesters arose, who, now finding the doctrines of the koran insufficient for the great end of government, viz. the preserving of good order, and the well being of civil society, have remedied its defects without appearing to derogate from its authority, or risking to alienate the least part of that implicit obedience, and profound veneration, the people paid to it, for under pretense of forming commentaries, as a single extension of the angel's or the prophet's ideas, they have provided codes of civil law."

--Porter: Observations, p. 50.

the ministers of justice and executors of laws. Procedure was quite simple in civil cases. Each party presented his case; two witnesses were necessary; the matter was summed up hastily, and the judge proclaimed the sentence.³³ He might consult the koran or the multeka. Usually the decision where both parties were Musselmen was unbiased, but this varied with the judge.³⁴ Yet injustice was most common for various reasons. False witnessing was an open profession, and written testimony was considered of no avail against spoken. Investigation was too quick and was often inaccurate. The winner had to pay the cost of the suit, and a Turk would often start a suit against a Christian as a means of extorting money.³⁵ Sometimes the abilities of the Turkish judges to decide in favor of those who had paid or could pay him the most was quite noticeable.³⁶

Then certain civil cases, those in which the state was a party, seem to have been excluded from the judicial forms. They were almost wholly in the hands of the sultan or his agents.

In criminal cases there was practically no trial at all and criminal executions were frequent.³⁷ There was the utmost barbarism in the means of execution, and torture was frequent to extort confession. Criminal justice was often bought off.

32. "It is not their laws, but the corrupt administration of them, the flagitious venality of their judges, and the number of false witnesses connived at, and whose testimony is accepted, that is the opprobrium of the Turkish empire."

--Porter: Observations, p. 84.

33. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 190.

34. Ibid., p. 195.

35. ibid., p. 202.

36. Eton: Survey, p. 31.

37. Thornton: Present State, I. p. 204.

The great point in which the Turkish law differed from that of most of the European nations was that it was personal rather than territorial. Peoples of various religions in the empire lived under different laws.³⁸ In some regions all were of one religion and therefore obeyed one law, but in other places there was a great variety. To know something of this varying relation of Moslem subjects, Christian subjects, and foreign residents to the government is of the utmost importance in understanding the administration of the empire.

The Turks had never forced their religion on their conquered subjects, but had allowed their political body to be divided, and had even encouraged institutions which deepened the division between conquerors and conquered. The Christians were given an almost separate administration, but they were never allowed to feel themselves in any other position than that of conquered and oppressed subjects. The real worth of the pash^aliks was considered to be in proportion to the number of non-Musselman subjects, because they had to pay a certain tribute, and the governor might, without having anything to fear therefrom, abuse his power and extort great sums from them.³⁹ Over the Musselman subjects the administration was light and usually just,⁴⁰ but the welfare

38. Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 34.

39. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 157.

40. "To the Musselman inhabitants, who are protected by the civil or military associations to which they are united, and whose complaints can always reach the throne, no jurisdiction can be more mild and paternal, no government more humane. The Turk, as well as the tributary cultivators, pay a quit rent, in consideration of which, the Turks at least, are free and independent. . . . their conduct is under no control but

of the Christian depended merely on the personal character of his provincial governor, and his only protectors were the clergy of the Greek church, and these as well as the Turks, might be oppressors.

The Christians of European Turkey were all assigned to the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch who resided at Constantinople. The language of church and schools was Greek, and outwardly the Christian peoples were united and were generally called Greeks by foreigners or by the Turks. But the Serbs and Bulgarians considered the Greek patriarch as much a foreigner as they did the Mohammedan clergy, and they were never reconciled to the arrangement.⁴¹ The patriarch, as well as the other high clergy, was usually chosen from the Phanariotes, and had to buy his see. The clergy were often the allies of the pashas and their interests were therefore rather in the oppression than in the protection of the Christian subjects.⁴² The clergy were given temporal authority, and the jurisdiction of the patriarch extended to a considerable part of the civil law, to questions of marriage, divorce, and inheritance where Christians only were concerned. By the treaty of Kainardji, Russia had been given a certain right of protection over the Greek church,⁴³ and on this she later based a claim to jurisdiction over all the Christian people of the empire. This jurisdiction was not recognized by Turkey, but was used by Russia as a justification of interference and aggression on her part.

40. (Continued) that of partial and indulgent law."

--Thornton: Present State, I, p. 157.

41. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 25.

42. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 299.

Foreign residents in Turkey were under the laws of their respective countries; and in all matters in which Turkish subjects were not concerned, they were amenable to the tribunal presided over by the consul of their country. In questions which related to landed property, foreigners were amenable to the Ottoman civil courts. Turkey recognized the passports issued by foreign governments when these passports had been duly countersigned by a Turkish consul or minister.⁴⁴

The public revenues of the Empire fall into into three great divisions: the miri, or public treasury; the hazne, or private fortune of the sultan; and ^{the} vakf, or the revenue consecrated to the service of public worship or charitable institutions. The surplus funds of the vakf formed a reserve which was occasionally applied to the government's use in time of distress.⁴⁵

The sources of revenue of the public treasury included direct and indirect taxes. The haratch or kharāj, or capitation tax, was a poll tax levied on all male adult rayahs (Christians and Jews). The amount was not equal, for the same amount was levied on each province as formerly, and this amount was divided among the inhabitants and varied greatly according as the number of inhabitants had changed. There was a territorial impost or tax

43. Treaty of Kaiarji--Article VII. "The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favor of the new church at Constantinople. . . . as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friendly Power."

--Holland: Treaty Relations of Turkey and Russia, p. 41

of one tenth on the produce of land, but the greater part of this was detained by the provinces. Persons subject to the haratch, and women had to pay a personal property tax. Customs duties made up a small part of the public income. Then the public treasury was augmented by monopolies, such as wheat, which was received from the provinces at low rates and sold out to bakers. The provinces most fertile in grain were subject to the istria, a contribution equal to one half the produce. Also Wallachia and Moldavia were forced to sell sheep, butter, and other products to agents of the government at prices set by the government. The princes or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia paid a tribute as a substitute for all other taxes; and yearly confirmed their title by purchase. Then taxes in kind were levied on certain provinces for the purpose of keeping up the navy and supplying the sultan's household.⁴⁶

The money in the public treasury was not supposed to be spent by the sultan for his private use. It was expended mainly for military purposes, the paying of the officers and workmen of the arsenal, for ship-building, and for the defense of the capital.⁴⁷

The sources of the revenues of the hazne were the imperial

44. Monroe: Turkey, p. 139.

45. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 3.

46. Thornton: Present State, II, pp. 8-42.

47. Ibid., p. 43. Eton says (Survey, p. 45), "However, the report of the expenditures for the year 1776 includes such items as 'Pay of people belonging to sultan's kitchen,' 'Pay of officers of sultan's palace,' 'Expenses of the kitchen', etc."

domains; presents from servants at certain festivals; payment for nominations to offices; contributions in produce from certain provinces;⁴⁸ revenues of mines; a duty of ten per cent on inheritances;⁴⁹ the inheritance and confiscation of the property of government officers; and revenue from new appointments to fiefs. The imperial domain consisted of lands that were not apportioned in military fiefs, and the sultan and various members of his family had certain fiefs that were appropriated to them.⁵⁰

The keeping in condition of national establishments, as well as the maintaining of the army was imposed on the provincial governors in the assignment of fiefs. The expenses of justice, police, public worship, building and maintaining forts, bridges, and roads, were also imposed on the governors.⁵¹

Most of the land of the Ottoman Empire was held on a military feudal tenure similar to that of Western Europe in the middle ages; the principal difference was that there were no mesne lords but all land was held directly from the sultan.⁵² Most of the land conquered by the Turks had been assigned to feudal lords who had to agree to take up arms on the summons of the sultan, to remain encamped as long as he ordered, and to maintain a contingent of cavalry and infantry.⁵³ They were supposed to be deprived of revenue and rank if disobedient, but by this time so many of the governors, and lesser fiefholders, had become

48. Thornton, Present State, II, p. 46.

49. Eton, Survey, p. 48.

50. Thornton, Present State, I, p. 223.

51. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 2.

52. Ibid, I, p. 215.

53: Thornton, Present State, I, p. 221.

partially or completely independent that they could seldom be deposed for disobedience. Fiefs were theoretically not strictly hereditary but in practice were usually conferred on the children of fiefholders, and often on descendants of other subjects who died in battle, the object being to encourage military service. Some estates had been left in the hands of the families of the original proprietors, who might go to war if they were Musselman, or might pay a war tribute.⁵⁴

The greater part of the army, therefore, was an extensive militia, supported on the feudal plan. Each governor had charge of the military administration of his own province. The beylerbeys were the commanders, and were subject only to the grand vizier.⁵⁵ At the declaration of war men were called out from the ages of sixteen to sixty. Besides the national militia there were the provincial troops which the pashas levied to serve in fortresses.

The most influential part of the military organization was the body of professional soldiers called the janizaries. This body of troops, who were closely organized, formed a sort of caste as well as a standing army; and they made a powerful organization which proved to be a real check on the sultan's power. The first body of janizaries had been formed in 1362 and had been composed of captive Christians trained to military service. Boys were chosen for their athletic make and were carefully trained and educated for the service. They were first placed in the service of some pasha or prince, or bound out to some Musselman peasant in order that they might strengthen their bodies in la-

bour and learn Islam. Then they were admitted to the corps of janizaries, but first they performed menial tasks and they were not considered equal to the others until they had signalized their courage in actual warfare.⁵⁷

Their organization was not very different from that of European armies. In the time of Selim III they were divided into about two hundred companies. The general, known as the yenicheri aghasi, was a powerful man, and all promotions depended on him.⁵⁸ The troops were disciplined according to rules laid down by the great Suleiman. In time of peace they guarded the frontier and exercised the functions of police officers.⁵⁹

The janizaries had many privileges and opportunities. They were exempt from the jurisdiction of the civil law and were judged by their own officers. Many were on the rolls who were not active, but who had enrolled merely to secure the privileges. They were called yamaks and received no pay, but they were exempt from the capitation tax. As rewards for service janizaries were often raised to very high ranks--one even became grand vizier.⁶⁰ Estimates as to the numbers of these troops vary to such an extent that no accurate opinion can be given.⁶¹

54. Thornton, Present State, I, p. 221.

55. Ibid., 215.

56. Ibid., 245.

57. Ibid., 247.

58. Ibid., 227.

59. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 228.

60. Ibid., 247.

61. These estimates are not for precisely the same period but in general for the last half of the eighteenth century and it is hard to explain their variation:

Porter--200,000 or 300,000	Eton,--	113,400
D'Ohsson--120,000	Thornton--	40,000

By the end of the eighteenth century the janizaries had degenerated from an efficient, powerful, closely organized body to a lawless and high-handed band of privileged soldiers, but that they had by no means lost all their power was shown by the fact that it was principally because of their opposition that Selim was unable to carry through certain much needed reforms. Their degeneracy may have been either the result or the cause of the general degeneracy in the administration of the empire. The former discipline had been relaxed and their laws were insufficient to meet the present needs, yet they were prejudiced against anything new. The sultans have been accused of trying to lessen the power of the janizaries by substituting weak men for their officers; but these attempts were probably merely personal, and were directed against certain leaders, rather than with a conscious effort toward the weakening of the organization.⁶²

There were certain other classes of professional soldiers in the empire, but their number was not large. There were the topgis, the gunners, or artillerymen, who received their pay from the treasury of the prince, ^{and} who were scattered throughout all the fortresses and garrison towns of the empire. Then there were the jebegis, or armourers, who guarded the arsenals and furnished implements to the janizaries; and the sakkas, or water carriers, who were really very important because of the nature of the country; and a body of professional cavalry.⁶³

61. (Continued) Peyssonnel--many million. De Tott--400,000
Lybyer believes that the number of real soldiers was only

62. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 238. 12000.

63. Ibid., 251.

The whole Turkish army was inefficient. Laxity of discipline, inability of the commanders to plan a strategic campaign, and the absence of up-to-date artillery and ammunition made the Turks the losers in every war about this period. The force of the Turkish empire was composed of the total mass of the Musselman subjects, but was unformed, undisciplined and intractable; "if compared to a European army, they were merely a disorderly crowd."⁶⁴ Their force lay in their attack but for that they had to be prepared; if they were taken unawares, the smallest number put them to flight.⁶⁵ Their ammunition was inadequate and poorly made.⁶⁶

The Turkish navy had seldom amounted to much,⁶⁷ although for the past few years, due to the energy and foresight of the late capudan pasha, Gazi Hassan, efforts had been made to make it more efficient. At the accession of Selim there were about seventeen warships, and part of these were lost in the war with Russia. Then there were about twenty large vessels, called caravellas, which belonged to merchants, and in time of war were used by the government.⁶⁸ Later the navy had several good ships

64. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 64.

65. Eton: Survey, p. 66. "In short, it is a mob assembled rather than an army levied. . . . None of those numerous details of a well organized body, necessary to give quickness, strength, and regularity to its actions, to avoid confusion, to repair damages; nothing the result of reasoning and combination; no systematic attack, defense, or retreat; no accident foreseen, or provided for."

--Eton: Survey, p. 67.

66. "Although the Ottoman government be provided with an arsenal, founderies for cannon, and other requisites for carrying on war, such is the supineness, ignorance, or criminal negligence of those who direct that department, that they are quite in-

built on European plans, but they were manned by people unaccustomed to the sea. There was no plan for educating and training seamen, the officers were not appointed for merit, and the whole business of the ships was done by slaves.⁶⁹

66. (Continued) adequate to the purposes for which they were intended. Among other instances of the defective state of their ammunition, I am creditably informed that, when the vizier marched against the French, no bombs were ready, and they were cast and sent off to the army, one hundred at a time, warm from the furnace, to Nicomedia; that on their arrival before El-Arish, the balls and shot were so bad, that instead of making a breach in the wall, they were shattered as soon as they impugned on it."

--From writings of W. G. Browne in 1802 quoted by Walpole: Travels, p. 153.

67. "Turkish forces on the sea have always been contemptible. A force of 300 was baffled by one Imperial and four Genoese ships in the siege of Constantinople."

--Thornton: Present State, I, p. 291.

68. Eton: Survey, p. 76.

69. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 294.

Chapter III

Conditions Demanding Reform

Perhaps the statement that "the most prominent feature in the Turkish establishments is abuse of power"¹ was rather severe; but certainly the fate of the provincials in the government was very hard. Everything had to be bought, and the peasants in the provinces were obliged to pay the price.

The pashas, or governors, had to pay a heavy price for their appointment to office. They owed their places solely to the sultan, who deposed or punished them without cause or trial, and who derived a regular revenue from the sale of offices.² The governors usually had to borrow money to pay for the appointment and it came to be like mortgaging the pashalik. They recouped themselves at the expense of the province. The agent of the money lenders, who was usually a Greek or Armenian banker, often accompanied the pasha and was the real ruler and oppressed the people heavily.³ As a result taxes were heavy; often about one half of the people's income was paid to the government.⁴ The revenues of the pashas were from rents on lands and imposts on cities and villages. Means of collection varied and the governors had absolute power in this matter.⁵ Complaints against the governors might be directed to the sultan, but in order to do any good they would have to be accompanied by more gold than he

1. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 86.

2. Ibid., 162.

would pay for reappointment.⁶ To cite an instance: Hadim Oglou had command of the Dardanelles; he was pasha and also hereditary chieftain, and one of the richest men in Turkey. He received enormous bribes from Greek merchants who sailed under the Russian flag and from others who carried ^{on} contraband trade. Complaints reached the capital of the smuggling, but he had spies there who heard the news. The governor sent a lot of money to some of the court favorites, and nothing more was heard of the matter.⁷ If the central government did punish the pashas, the people received no benefit; because the government simply appropriated the confiscated wealth.⁸

Appointment was supposed to be only for a year, although reappointment could be bought in the same manner as new appointment. But the uncertainty of the office discouraged any attempts on the part of the governor to improve the condition of his province or to govern his people benevolently.⁹ The succession of a new governor might defeat all the plans of improvement suggested or carried out by a former one, if he had made such an attempt.¹⁰

3. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 318.

4. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 18.

5. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 156.

6. Ibid., 185.

7. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 94.

8. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 320.

9. "Uncertain how long he may enjoy his present dignity, he is regardless of gaining the attachment or approbation of his subjects; his time is not employed in projecting works of public utility, or forming schemes for the general improvement of the province, or for securing and facilitating the intercourse between different parts of it."

--Walpole: Memoirs, p. 4

10. Ibid., p. 22.

The power of the inferior rulers was similar to that of the pashas. And there were throughout the empire great numbers of petty local tyrants who farmed the revenues of districts of varying sizes.¹¹ The custom of farming taxes was universal; the contractor would advance all or part of the revenue to the central government, and then would extort money from the peasants by any means he could.¹²

11. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 320.

12. "The revenues of a certain district, perhaps ten or twelve villages, are to be disposed of. The person who wishes to farm them, after ascertaining their value with all practical accuracy, goes to a minister, and offers what he thinks proper for a term of one, two, three, or four years. As the government is always indigent, the offer of ready money is generally accepted; and nothing more is required, to enable the farmer to exercise unlimited authority over the district in question, and to augment his revenue by every means of fraud, violence, and extortion. Thus, what was originally supposed to produce fifteen purses, he perhaps makes to yield forty. The peasantry is thereby ruined, but this does not embarrass him, who is concerned only with what the district will yield during the term for which he holds it. . . . The farmer must oppress in order to reimburse himself for his enormous expenses, or he must fail. The peasant being rated in proportion to the gross produce of the land he cultivates, cannot possibly do more than glean a scanty subsistence, which may be obtained by slight exertions and the most wretched system of husbandry; and thus, whilst there is, on the one hand, a strong positive motive to oppress, the stimulus to production, on the part of the land holders, is the most feeble and negative that can be imagined."

--From writings of W. G. Browne, in 1802,
quoted by Walpole: Travels, p. 150.

The oppression of the governors and the tax farmers was largely responsible for the economic distress of this period. The inequality of property was striking. The government officers, of course, were the opulent ones, and the peasant class could not raise themselves. The display of any wealth on the part of the lower classes made them subject to extortion and plunder, and

what property any of them might gain, he carefully concealed, and lived in a most wretched condition. The empire had great resources but the spirit of enterprise was checked by the insecurity of property and the defects in the administration. Slow payment of money and high rates of interest discouraged industry. The pashas hoarded part of the money and thus withdrew it from circulation. This increased the distress. There was a great decline in the number of towns, but a far greater decline in the amount of cultivated land; because many of the peasants flocked to the towns, since there they were given some help, the governors being afraid to allow famines in the towns. The land being uncultivated bred disease, such as fevers and leprosy, which caused a decline in the population, so that the country was further depopulated.¹³

Since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, the prestige of the Porte¹⁴ had gradually declined, and the power of the local governors had constantly increased, until at the time of Selim III it presented a formidable problem to the government. There was a tendency for the pashas to refuse military assistance to the sultan and then try to make their provinces hereditary in their families. A contemporary author wrote: "Governors of distant provinces, availing themselves of the resources of the district, have in frequent instances, so firmly established themselves as to resist efficaciously the right of the sovereign to eject or dispossess them. When a pasha, from a sense of his own strength or of the weakness of the government, aspires to independency he

13. Walpole: Memoirs, pp. 5-13.

14. So called from the building which contains the quarters of

withholds the contributions due to the Porte: he however negotiates while he threatens, and if the attempt fails of checking his insolence by the interposition of an officer, the same officer is commissioned on the part of the sultan to confirm him in his dignity, to sanction, and even to recompense his revolt by conferring upon him additional honours."¹⁵ In some places the power of the governor was so strong that the government made little effort to oppose him, but in many places there was constant civil warfare, and it is impossible to calculate the resulting distress.

Revolt was the common practice among the chief pashas, but there were some who, because either of the greatness of their power, or the greatness of their province, became particularly famous. The great pashalik of Bagdad had been in reality independent, except for very short intervals, since the first part of the eighteenth century. The sultan only confirmed the pasha. The people and especially the soldiery of Bagdad chose him, and he ruled with a despotic power, and paid no revenue at all for his extensive province. Whenever there was a war with a European power, and the pasha of Bagdad was called on to furnish his quota of troops, he pretended that it was necessary to keep them all at home to defend his province against the Arabs.¹⁶

14. (Continued) the vizier, foreign minister, minister of the interior, and hall for the meeting of the council of state.

--Monroe: Turkey, p. 261.

But another writer claims that it was because a certain sultan likened his empire to a tent and the government to the tent door.

--Davey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 122.

Porte means originally gateway. Sublime Porte is the French for Turkish words meaning lofty gate.

In Egypt the trouble with the rebellious governors came to a head in the reign of Selim III. The ruling power in Egypt was in the hands of an official class known as Mamelukes, who were disobedient and unsubdued.¹⁷ Their leaders, or beys, controlled the government.¹⁸

In Syria the power of the sultan was actually almost nothing.¹⁹ Here there were a great number of independent governors, but none was strong enough to avoid constant warfare with neighboring pashas or with the Porte. An observant traveller wrote at this period: "The weakness of the Turkish government cannot appear

15. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 163.

16. Eton: Survey, p. 279. A traveller through this country in 1758 wrote: "Basha Solyman is the chief commander at Bagdad under the Grand Seignor, in effect, he is the supreme lord himself of this part of the empire. He makes no remittances to the Porte, but rather he yearly brings his master in debt for repairs, or pretended repairs, of fortifications, support of troops, etc. The Grand Seignor has more than once tried to supercede him, but the Janizaries, of whom he has at least 40,000 under his command, would admit of no other master."

--Ives: "A Journey from Persia to England." p. 281.

17. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 23.

18. "All Egypt is independent. The pasha sent to Cairo is in effect a prisoner during his government, which is only nominal; the Porte draws little or no revenue from it, and no troops except a few fanatics in time of war with the Christians. The Turks have at different times got possession of Cairo, but never could maintain themselves in the government. . . . The actual power resides in the Mamalukes, and the bey who has most of them in his suite, and is consequently the most powerful. As to the pasha sent by the Porte, he has at different times had more or less influence, but is in general a mere cypher, obliged to submit to the will of the beys, who dismiss him when they please. They have sometimes entirely thrown off all appearance of submission to the Porte; and at present as well as generally, their obedience is only nominal. The tribute which Egypt ought to send the Porte is frequently withheld, or, if transmitted, it is diminished by deductions for the reparation of canals, fortresses, etc., at the will of the beys."

--Eton: Survey, pp. 283--286

in a stronger light than in the province of Syria, almost the whole of which is held by governors in a state of rebellion; who have the resemblance, or so great a reality of power, that the forces of the Porte are not deemed adequate to subdue them. The mountains of Libanus and part of Antilibanus, belong to a family wholly independent of Constantinople. Djezzar, building fortifications, and establishing himself as a little prince, bids defiance to his enemies, the people of Tripoli depose and confirm whom they please, as their governor. Between Damascus and Aleppo one village is at war with another. . . . On the gulf of Scanderoon, Kutchuk Ali, of Paras, has been declared a rebel, and is the cause of the most serious alarm to the government."²⁰ This account does not vary materially from that of the other contemporary students of the empire. Another stated that "the pasha of Acre, who has an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, besides being in possession of the strong country of the Druses, is perfectly independent of the Porte, as was his predecessor."²¹ Djezzar of Acre refused tax and tribute, and put to death the sultan's messengers.²² The pashas rivalled each other in lawlessness and independence.

In Europe there were a number of rebellious and independent governors, though none with very great provinces. Passvan Oglou of Viddin was perhaps the most celebrated. For many years he defied the whole force of the sultan, and made invasion into ad-

19. Eton: Survey, p. 282.

20. Walpole: Travels, p. 330.

21. Eton: Survey, p. XIX.

22. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 317.

jacent provinces, like an independent and avowed foreign enemy.²³ Ali Pacha had made good his independence in Albania.²⁴ Aghas in Macedonia resided in their castles surrounded by guards of Albanians, and lived in a state of constant warfare with each other, or with whoever might oppose them.²⁵ Throughout Turkey there were mutinous hereditary feudal lords who styled themselves dereh beys, or Lords of the Valleys; who were arrogant to the sultan, and oppressive to their subjects.²⁶

Besides the rebellious governors there were throughout the Empire groups of people--mostly small nationalities, who felt themselves to be more or less independent of the Porte, and this increased the decentralization of the Empire. In Greece the Suliotes and other tribes to the north were practically independent, and had become leagued, at the instigation of Catharine of Russia, in active insurrection against the Turks.²⁷ All Greece stood in a rather special, privileged relation to the empire, probably because the population was principally Christian, and Christians everywhere were more or less autonomous. There was a large amount of self-government in the towns of the Peloponnese.²⁸ Very great privileges were enjoyed in certain of the islands. Chios had been allowed to retain her government as it had been under the Genoese; and Tenos and Naxos retained the right to govern themselves.²⁹ The Greek islands were only vis-

23. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, I, p. 317

24. Cambridge Modern History, IX, p. 385.

25. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 161.

26. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 321.

27. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, I, p. 298.

28. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 28.

29. Ibid., 28.

ited by the Turks when the capitation money was collected.³⁰ In the mountain districts of Pindus and Olympus the Christians had the right of bearing arms, and they formed military communities, called "free villages."³¹ On the peninsula of Chalkidike there was a confederation of villages which elected local authorities. Athens was the private property of the sultan, who let it out for life to the highest bidder, and the Athenians annually elected most of their local officers.³¹

The Albanians had always stubbornly resisted Turkish rule, and were governed by natives who had varying power over them.³² Bosnia and Croatia obeyed the porte just when it suited them, and the sultan reaped little benefit from them.³³ In Bosnia the Turkish governor had become a mere figure-head, and all real power was centered in the Bosnian noblemen who had gradually become hereditary headmen.³⁴ Austrian dominion over Servia came to an end in 1791 and the national spirit of the people began to be

30. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 20

31. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 29.

32. "Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be found in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by one man, under the Turkish title of Bolu bashee; others obey their elders; others are under no subjection, but each man governs his own family. The power in some places is in abeyance, and although there is no apparent anarchy there are no rulers. There are parts of the country where every agha or bey is a petty chieftain, exercising every right over the men of the village. The Porte, which in the days of Ottoman greatness divided the country into several small pashaliks and commanderies, is now but little respected, and the limits of her different divisions are confused and forgotten."

--Quoted from John Cain Hobhouse by Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 322.

33. Eton: Survey, p. 285.

34. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 21.

aroused at that time, although there was no manifestation of revolt until several years later when the conduct of the janizaries drove the rayahs to rebel.³⁵

Arabia did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the sultan, except in a few towns. The Wahabites, a sect among the Arabs, were the masters of practically all Arabia except Mecca and Medina which they had not yet conquered.³⁶ Throughout Syria there were a number of independent peoples. All the inhabitants of the mountain district from Smyrna to Palestine, and in the mountains in general throughout the empire, were perfectly independent and were usually considered by the Porte as enemies.³⁷

This independence and semi-independence of the various peoples and governors throughout the empire was largely responsible for the general lawless condition and hindrance to economic life. The transportation of goods was slow on account of the possibility of being held up by fierce wandering tribes.³⁸ A well informed man, writing about 1803, says: "At this time, there is no province in Romelia, where troops of licentious banditti do not annually intercept the caravans, interrupt communications, plunder the husbandmen, and desolate the country."³⁹ Various writers report that the conditions around Scanderoon were especially bad, and that caravans on the way from Scanderoon to Aleppo were obliged to go by the way of Antioch, as all the country through

35. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 454.

36. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 316.

37. Eton: Survey, p. 281 and Walpole: Memoirs, p. 19.

38. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 7.

39. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 65.

which the direct road led, belonged to the Kurds, who would not allow the Turks to pass it.⁴⁰

The rebellious state of the provinces was only partially the cause of the lawlessness of the janizaries. The weakness of the sultan and of his administrative machinery had allowed these troops to gain an independent power that was a constant danger to the government and to the people of the empire.⁴¹ Their power had become so great that they had more than once dethroned a sultan. But while their power had increased, their efficiency had decreased, they had lost a great amount of their martial spirit, and they could no longer be trusted in the field against a regularly organized army such as the European nations could

40. Eton: Survey, p. 282. Walpole gives a more detailed account of the conditions here: "On the gulf of Scanderon, Hutchuk Ali, of Paras, with two hundred followers, has been declared a rebel, and the cause of the most serious alarm to the government for forty years; he allows no one to pass through his territory without exacting an enormous contribution. If a ship anchors before Paras, he endeavors to make the crew prisoners, to take possession of the ship, and demands a ransom of the ship, and demands a ransom for the people. This pasha is without money, and has but a handful of men; yet the vizier with 3000 troops, on his return through Asia Minor, is obliged to make a grand detour in order to avoid too near an approach to the domain of this rebel. The caravans coming from Asia Minor to Aleppo are compelled to go a journey of fifteen days out of their route that they may not pass through the territory of Ali."

--Walpole: Travels, p. 330.

41. "The wound in the monarchy, uncured and incurable, is the power which the janizaries have of exciting sedition. It is a power the more dangerous, as it is without control; and while they continue to exist, the state contains in itself a source of weakness and decay."

--Walpole: Memoirs, p. 27.

present.⁴²

One of the conditions within the Empire which most surely demanded reform was the discrimination between Christians and

Musselmans. There was no attempt on the part of the Musselman to bring the Christian to his belief--he simply despised him, and took advantage of him at every possible opportunity. The Turk was not merely exalted above his subject as a conqueror, but he considered himself still more highly elevated as the favorite of heaven; ⁴³ and he considered his authority, influence, powers of mind, and force of arms, as proper objects of barter in affairs between or against infidels, without regarding the action from a moral point of view.⁴⁴ Pashas considered a pashalik with a large number of Christian (or Jews) as of greatest value; because they could oppress them and extort from them, with little danger that the complaints of the infidels would reach the Porte; and if these complaints did reach the sultan, they did not seem in any way to hurt the position of the governor.⁴⁶ Musselmen might easily bring complaints to the ear of the sultan, and they were also protected in the provinces by the body of worthies who assisted the governor.

A Christian might not kill a Mohammedan even ⁱⁿ self defense; and if a Christian should strike a Mohammedan he was most commonly put to death on the spot or at least, ruined by fines.⁴⁷ If a

42. "The soldiery, soon learning its power, set up and deposed sultans as seemed good to it, and extorted heavy bribes from each successive puppet of its choice. The unbounded exercise of capricious power quickly led to license and corruption, and the janizaries by degrees lost their martial character, and could not be trusted as of old in the field. A bribe was of more consequence to them than a victory. . . . The worst feature of all was their inefficient officering. Their commanders were appointed not for merit, but in consideration of bribes."

—Lane--Poole: Turkey, p. 206.

43. Eton: Survey, p. 13.

44. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 178.

Mohammedan killed a Christian he was generally only fined. The testimony of a Christian was little regarded in courts of justice; at best two testimonies were considered as one, and were even overborne by that of a single Musselman, if he were reputed to be at all an honest man. Christians could build no new church, nor could they without great sums obtain the license even to repair the old one.⁴⁸ The distinction between Christian and Mohammedan was carried to so great a length that even matters of dress were made a subject of restriction.⁴⁹

While this discrimination caused much evil, it must be remembered that the matter was not all one-sided. The Turkish government was one most tolerant of religions, and at this time it was something of a privilege to be allowed to worship as one pleased. Then Christians were not excluded entirely from office, although positions as bankers, merchants, collectors, farmers of revenue, etc. were the highest they could obtain.⁵⁰ The Turks disdained the details of business and for that reason allowed the Christians to handle these affairs. However, to profess Islam has always been a high road to honors, and therefore many abandoned Christianity. Many of these converts became conservative, and opposed reforms, and were fanatical in their loyalty to the

45. Christians and Jews were grouped together, as they all paid the capitulation tax, and they were generally known as rayahs.

46. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 17.

47. Eton: Survey, p. 99.

48. Eton: Survey, p. 100.

49. Ibid., p. 98. Eton claimed that the Christians had to wear dark colors and paint their houses dark, and that they were liable to death for violation of these rules. This statement is possibly exaggerated.

50. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 300.

prophet. Many of the so-called "Turks" who were the worst persecutors of the Christians, were not Turks at all but were converted Christians.⁵¹

The discrimination, then, was a matter entirely of religion, and not of race; but it was one of the matters that was earliest recognized by broad minded men of the empire as demanding reform.

51. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 21.

Chapter IV.

Previous Attempts at Reform in Turkey

In undertaking the study of any reform movement it is first necessary to define clearly what we mean by "reform." Throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire we find those people who desired reform divided between two interpretations of the word: the majority wanted a return to the old methods of warfare and administration that had made for the glorious period of the empire—an extermination of the abuses and laxity which had crept into the old system; but others, of whom Selim III was a conspicuous example, desired a complete change in the system, to conform with the standards of the more advanced European nations.

The glory and prestige of the Empire had reached its height under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520—1566). Since that time there had been a degeneration in the administration of the Empire, a decline in its prestige, and a disintegration of its power. This decline was not unnoticed by the sultans, and various of them made attempts at reform, their ideas of which were usually to bring everything back to the glorious conditions of Suleiman's time. Osman II (1618—1622) determined to destroy the janizaries, who had grown too formidable, had become mutinous, and were interfering with the government, and to substitute a new army made up of Kurds, and to make the militia more efficient; but his plans were opposed by the Janizaries, who had power enough to depose him.¹

1. Eton: Survey, p. 152.

Probably the most noted, the broadest minded and the most successful of the reformers were the four Kiuprilis, who were the grand viziers during the period from 1656 to 1702, a time in which there were few strong sultans and the viziers had practical control of the empire. The first Kiuprili, Mohammed, was of Albanian descent and had risen gradually to his position. He was cruel and relentless, but he had great firmness of character and common sense, and was very active. He introduced administrative reforms, quelled provincial revolts, revived the naval strength somewhat, and fortified the Dardanelles and other

² places. His son Ahmed succeeded him and was vizier from 1661 to 1675. Ahmed Kiuprili has been considered by some the greatest statesman of his country. He was stern, but unusually humane, and was a military leader. He repressed insurrection and disorder, maintained justice and good government, and restored a certain amount of the financial and military strength to the empire.³ Zadeh Mustapha, the "third kiuprili" was called to the vizierate in 1689. The thirteen years intervening between his rule and that of his brother had been a period of disorder and decline. His prudent measures reestablished some degree of order in the army and the fleet, and he placed in the most important pashaliks governors on whom he could rely. But highest praise has been given to him because "he had the wisdom to recognize the necessity of the Sublime Porte strengthening itself by winning the loyal affections of its Christian subjects."⁴ He saw

that the various Christian peoples were rising and joining Christian invaders; and he gave orders against the oppression of rayahs and allowed new and larger churches to be built. The fourth Koprili, Hussein, made an effort to take advantage of the peace after Karlowitz and introduce order in the country, but his efforts were unavailing; he was even driven from office, and the sultan, who had sustained him, was forced to abdicate.⁵

It was not until in the course of the eighteenth century, however, that great attempts were made to reform along the line of introducing western methods and ideas. In this century the name of Gazi Hassan stands out prominently. Hassan became capudan pasha, or commanding admiral of the naval forces, in 1773. "He employed all the influence which his official and personal character gave him, and which, under Sultan Abdul Hamid, was almost unlimited, to introduce various reforms into the Turkish navy; and, had he been properly seconded, would have certainly raised it to a considerable importance."⁶ The reforms and improvements which this great man introduced were very comprehensive, and included the construction of vessels, the education of officers, and the supplying of trained seamen. Aided by an English shipbuilder, Hassan entirely altered the cumbrous rigging of the Turkish ships, and equipped them after the English system. Then he compelled the commanders to attend personally to the good

3. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p.

4. Ibid., 77.

5. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 451.

6. Eton; Survey, p. 79.

order and efficiency of their ships and crews;⁷ and in 1776 attempted to establish a college at Constantinople for the regular education of young men as officers for the navy.⁸ He collected all the good soldiers that he could from Algiers, and various seaports, to man the ships, and he endeavored to keep a sufficient body of able seamen always ready at Constantinople to man the fleet in any emergency.⁹ A reform which Hassan attempted and which seems to be quite modern was in the matter of the abolition of the use of liquor by the sailors. "Before his appointment as High Admiral, the Turkish marines used to commit the greatest excesses whenever they were ordered to embark on a cruize. . . . He determined to abolish this licentious practice, and succeeded in compelling them to go unarmed, whenever they were allowed to be on shore, and even then only in small parties. . . . He ordered the doors of all taverns and wine shops to be sealed during the time his fleet was in any port; and if he then found a seaman drunk, he first made him confess where he had procured the liquor; he then punished the wine seller."¹⁰

During the first part of his career Hassan was quite successful in the command. He was sent to recover for the sultan some of the provinces which had recently revolted. "He defeated the forces of Sheikh Tahir in Syria, besieged him in Acre, captured that important city, and reduced the district around it to

7. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 268.

8. Eton: Survey, p. 84.

9. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 268.

10. Walpole: Travels, p. 57.

temporary obedience to the Porte.¹¹ He had similar success in the Morea.

He tried to improve the army, but found all his attempts ineffectual. When he saw that it was impossible to discipline the army, and had given up all hope of it, he proposed a new order of battle.¹² But opposition to Hassan was growing and it was in his army reforms that he had the least success. The grand vizier and other great officers of the Porte were fearful of seeing the grand admiral with so great a force constantly at his disposal in the city,¹³ and were constantly desiring his downfall. Their opportunity came when Hassan was no longer successful. He had been put in command of the armies that were defeated by the Russians in 1789, and the excitement and tension was so great that Selim could only appease the multitude by putting to death the gallant, but lately unsuccessful veteran, Gazi Hassan.¹⁴

Throughout the last half of the eighteenth century the French, in pursuance of their policy to maintain the strength of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, as counterweights against the Hapsburgs and the Tsars, made attempts to improve the military and naval strength of the Turks. It is reported that in 1775 there was a considerable number of French officers in Constantinople, still remaining in the pay of their own court, zealously engaged in the introduction of military reforms, and assisting

11. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 269.

12. Eton: Survey, p. 68.

13. Ibid., 84.

14. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 296.

Hassan in his attempts to improve the navy.¹⁵ Baron de Tott, a skilled engineer and a man of general ability was perhaps the most prominent. He had been invited to come to Constantinople by the sultan, and he had been given considerable power over the army and the fleet.¹⁶ It was upon De Tott's suggestion that a machine was erected for masting vessels, a new foundry for cannon was built, a body of artillerymen was instituted, and forts were erected on the Bosphorus to secure the passage to the Black Sea. Another Frenchman, a shipbuilder, by the name of Le Brun also aided Hassan in the reform of shipbuilding.¹⁷

15. Ranke: *Servia*, p. 97.

16. Davey: *Sultan and Subjects*, p. 159.

17. Thornton, *Present State*, I.

Chapter V

The Reforms of Selim III

Selim III ascended the throne then, at a time when a desire for reform, especially in the direction of westernizing the army and navy, was beginning to be pretty generally felt in the empire.¹ "He was a young man of considerable abilities and high spirit; and his people gladly hailed the accession of a youthful prince, active in person, and energetic in manner, under whom they hoped to see an auspicious turn given to the long declining fortunes of the empire. Selim had been treated by his uncle, the late sultan, with far greater kindness, and had been allowed much more freedom both bodily and mental, than the nonreigning princes of the blood-royal were usually permitted to enjoy. One of his intimate associates was an Italian physician, named Lorenzo, and from him and other Franks, Selim eagerly sought and obtained information respecting the nations of western Europe, their civil and military institutions, and the causes of that superiority which they had indisputably acquired over the Ottomans. Selim even opened a correspondence with the French king and his ministers vergennes and Montmorin, in which he sought political instruction from the chiefs of what he was taught to regard as the foremost nation of the Franks. He felt keenly the abuses which prevailed in his own country, and it is said that his father,

1. This description by Creasy of the character and ideals of Selim is so good and so well stated that I have taken the liberty to quote it word for word.

Sultan Mustapha III, had bequeathed him a memorial, (diligently studied and venerated by young Selim), in which the principal events of Mustapha's unhappy reign were reviewed, the degeneracy of the Turkish nation discussed, and the great evils that prevailed in the state were pointed out, with exhortations to their thorough removal.

"Thus trained and influenced, Selim came, an ardent reformer, to the throne; but the war which he found raging between his empire and the confederate powers of Austria and Russia, required all his attention in the beginning of his reign, which opened with the darkest scenes of calamity and defeat." Selim welcomed peace as an opportunity of carrying out the reforms, of which he realized the urgent necessity.

To correct the evils of state he projected changes in almost all the administrative departments. He curtailed the power of the vizier somewhat by requiring him to consult the divan; and the divan was reorganized.² Attempts were made to reform the financial administration. The form of the budget was changed;³ an attempt was made to abolish the farming of taxes and an excise tax was imposed to meet the additional expense of the military reforms.⁴

Matters of provincial government occupied much of Selim's attention. He abolished feudalism and strengthened the govern-

1. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, pp. 294-295.

2. Ibid., 331.

3. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 431.

4. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 50.

ment by somewhat curtailing the powers of the pashas. One of his greatest efforts was directed toward regaining control of the power in Egypt. Efforts to subdue the rebellious Serbs led to the final uprising which caused Selim's downfall.

Selim encouraged the advance of education. He patronized schools, especially those in Greece,⁵ and frequently visited the college at Sulitza which had been established for the education of army engineers.⁶ Printing establishments were revived, and many French books were translated into the Turkish language and printed. A French professor was appointed at Sulitza, and in the library there were placed many French books, among which was the Encyclopedie.⁶ Selim permitted M. de Verninac, the Envoy of the French Republic, to establish, in 1795, a weekly newspaper in the French language--of which some twenty numbers were actually published. This was not very successful, but it marks the first attempt to establish journalism in Turkey.⁷

Selim III realized the advantage of diplomatic intercourse with other nations and he sought to establish permanent embassies in the courts of all the great nations of Europe.⁸ This was a step which Turkey had been very slow in taking, because of her great prejudice against Christian peoples.

In matters of defense and the navy Selim attempted to carry forward the work of the great Gazi Hassan. He had done himself

5. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 33.

6. Ranke: Servia, p. 98.

7. Davey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 162. Ahmed Emin: Development of Turkey, p. 28.

8. Eton: Survey, p. 190.

and the nation a great wrong when he had allowed himself to be influenced into executing this capable reformer. After peace was concluded with Russia in 1792, the sultan purchased model ships from England, employed French shipbuilders, and constructed a number of new vessels. He employed an English general at Ismael to improve the fortresses, and to help organize a corps of engineers.⁹ He also temporarily cleared away the Bulgarian and Macedonian brigands, and the pirates in the Aegean.¹⁰

But the direction to which the great efforts of Selim's life were given was to reforms in the military force of the empire. He knew that an efficient army was necessary to maintain his other reforms, and to regain the prestige of Turkey, or even to maintain her present position. Soon after the close of the war with Russia Selim began to introduce changes. The people hoped to see him, like a sultan of old, take the field at the head of the janizaries and spahis, and overthrow his enemies, in accordance with the holy books and recognized Musselman ideas. Selim, however, perceived that the cause of his country's disasters lay in the superiority of the military resources of his enemies, and their experience in the art of war; and he resolved to assimilate their methods into the Turkish army, as far as possible.¹¹ A change in the system of government, which was introduced under the name of nizami djedid, or new constitution, was effected by three ministers, the secretary for foreign affairs,

9. Ranke: *Servia*, p. 98.

10. Miller: *Ottoman Empire*, p. 19.

11. Ranke: *Servia*, p. 96.

the minister of the war department, and the steward of the dowager empress. The avowed object of the institution was the augmentation of the standing army, to be disciplined according to the approved system of European tactics, and supported by the imposition of new taxes.¹²

An interesting story is related as to how Selim first came to be interested in western military methods. As this has been retold by several modern writers, perhaps it is worth repeating here. "The grand vizier, in the late Russian war, had a prisoner who was by birth a Turk, but being carried early in his youth to Moscow, he had become Christian, and found in a Russian nobleman a patron who gave him a good education and placed him in the army. He was a lieutenant when he was taken prisoner, and had the reputation of being a good officer. The vizier took pleasure in conversing with him. He represented the advantages of European discipline, not only in battle, but in many other points of view, and particularly in securing the army from mutiny. By his persuasion the vizier formed a small corps, composed of renegadoes and a few indigent Turks, to whom the prisoner taught the European exercise, which they used to perform before the vizier's tent to divert him. Peace being concluded, the vizier returned to Constantinople and conducted this little corps with him. They were left at a village a few leagues from the capital. The sultan, learning of them, went to see how the infidels fought battles, as he would have gone to a puppet show; but he was so

12. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 149.

struck with the superiority of their fire, that from that instant he resolved to introduce the European discipline into the army and abolish the janizaries. This step, as might be expected, produced a mutiny which was only appeased by the sultan's consenting to continue them their pay during their life times, but at the same time¹³ he ordered that no recruits should be received into their corps.¹³ This incident, if true, may have been responsible for increasing the sultan's determination to introduce western methods, but his first realization had undoubtedly come in his study before he became sultan, and through his contact with European soldiers in his first Russian war.

The new troops, which were known as nizams were affiliated with the janizaries so as to disarm the jealousy of the latter, and were properly drilled and given a distinctive uniform.¹⁴ In 1804 Selim organized the artillery and placed it on a footing of privilege superior to that of the janizaries. And in 1805 he decreed that the finest youth of the empire should be taken, even from the janizaries themselves, and enrolled among the nizams.¹⁵ The total number of new troops raised in and near Constantinople was 14,000, and in Asia about 60,000.¹⁶ The new troops are said to have lacked confidence in the European discipline and not to have had the enthusiasm of the janizaries.¹⁷

Selim remodelled the whole system of artillery; he adopted

13. Told by Eton: Survey, p. 92. Retold and apparently credited by Creasy and Ranke.

14. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 454.

15. Cambridge Modern History, IX, p. 384.

16. Clarke: Travels, Part 2, Sect. 1, Vol. III, p. 375.

17. Eton: Survey. p. 94.

51.

the dimensions of the French cannon, especially for field pieces.¹⁸

He established military schools, with skilled European instructors. His reforms were thorough-going in scope, but little effective.

18. Ranke: *Servia*, p. 98.

Chapter VI

Opposition to Reforms

At the very first Sultan Selim's newly instituted militia was in every respect a success; it grew in numbers and there was some hope for a growth in popularity. But the sultan was working in the midst of possibilities of strong opposition from every side.

Numerous causes worked toward the failure of the various projected reforms. The janizaries and corrupt officials and the provincial rulers were fundamentally opposed to the schemes, and the conservatives joined with them against reforms of European origin.¹ The excise which had been levied to support the new troops and improvements, had advanced the price of tobacco and other luxuries and some necessities and this caused universal complaint and discontent.²

Selim failed partly because he lacked what a reforming prince requires, the assistance and support of the lower and unprivileged classes. The sultan was unable to enforce his orders that the janizaries should be disciplined according to the European system. He could only have done this by making war against the provinces in which these rebellious troops held sway. But he could not use the support of the provincials, or at any rate of the provincial rayahs, against the janizaries, be-

1. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 455.

2. Clarke: Travels, part 2, Sect. 1, Vol. III, p. 376.

cause of the religious nature of the problem. On the contrary, he was forced to maintain a constant warfare on these and even to support the janizaries against the rayahs. Such of his Mohammedan subjects as he had been able to organize were insufficient to effect his object.³

The conservative and fanatical spirit of the ulema was one of the greatest obstacles to progress and reform.⁴ A writer at the beginning of Selim's reforms said: "To introduce a unity into the government this ambitious body should be wholly extirpated."⁵ The ulema opposed the projects from the narrow religious point of view and it was probably because of this that they were so actively engaged in the project to place the fanatically orthodox Mustapha on the throne.⁶

From 1802 to 1806 there was no European war, but it was not a period of tranquillity for the Turkish Empire. The Wahabites continued their conquests, and in 1802 they captured Mecca and Medina, so that all Arabia was now in their possession. The loss of the Holy Cities, and the manner in which the Wahabites treated the Mohammedan sanctuaries, excited a profound sensation throughout the Ottoman Empire and tended to prejudice the Turkish part of the population against their innovating sultan, whose reign was marked by such visitations.⁷

In 1804 there was a serious outbreak in Adrianople, whither

3. Ranke: *Servia*, p. 217.

4. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, XXVII, p. 427.

5. Eton: *Survey*, p. 36.

6. Davey: *Sultan and Subjects*, p. 162.

7. Creasy: *Ottoman Turks*, II, p. 346.

20,000 of the new troops had been sent, ostensibly to put down the revolt in Serbia, but really to try to bring about the reform of the European provinces. So strong was the opposition that the troops were recalled and the anti-reform party was greatly strengthened.⁸

The final defeat of Sultan Selim was brought about by a combination of the small independent-feeling nationalities who were supported by outside powers, the rebellious janizaries, and the religious authorities, the ulema.

In 1806 the rayahs of Serbia, galled by the oppression of the janizaries and encouraged by promises of help from Russia, rose under Kara George and Milosch Obrenovitch, and foiled a plot of the janizaries for general massacre and captured some of the Turkish strongholds. The revolt was directed at first only against the turbulent janizaries, but Selim could not side with the Christians against the Musselmen, so he arrested the Christian leaders and ordered a loyal pasha to disarm the whole population. But the Christians refused to surrender; Kara George defeated the pasha, and the Servians drove back the Turkish forces and captured Belgrade.⁹

In the meantime the French ambassador had been urging an alliance of Turkey and France, and had urged Turkey to keep a tight hold on Wallachia and Moldavia, where the Russian right of interference had resulted almost in Russian rule. In order

8. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 455.

9. Cambridge Modern History, p.387.

to do this Selim deposed the reigning hospodars. The Tsar considered this a declaration of war and sent troops into these provinces.¹⁰

So at this difficult moment the army was forced to march to the Danube, leaving the government in the hands of men hostile to reform. And the janizaries, instead of fighting, directed their efforts to routing the nizams. They met the new troops in frequent battles and were victorious. The colonel of the janizaries was raised to be grand vizier, but peace was not restored.¹¹

In 1807 the garrisons of the Black Sea forts at the entrance to the straits, rose in rebellion and killed their officers. The sultan sought to appease them by pacific means, but the first step taken against them excited open rebellion against him in his capital. The janizaries overturned their camp kettles as an intimation that they would no longer accept food from Sultan Selim.¹² They insisted on the abolition of the new troops; but even this concession did not satisfy them.

The enemies of the government pointed out that deposition was the only means of quieting things. The number of janizaries was increased on the pretense of some revolt and the aggression of Russia. The rebels in a body demanded of the mufti an order of death for those they marked, and the ministers who had sanctioned the innovations in the army were executed. The barracks

10. Cambridge Modern History, p. 388.

11. Clarke: Travels, Part 2, Sect. I, Vol. III, p. 376.

12. Ranke: Servia, p. 218.

of the new troops were destroyed and a general massacre began.¹³.
The next day the mob went to the palace and insisted on the deposition of Selim. The mufti then declared the sultan dethroned, "for having abandoned himself to Christian vices, and violated the holy ordinances of the Koran."¹⁴

13. Clarke: Travels, Part 2, Sect. I, Vol. III, p. 376.

14. Ranke: Servia, p. 219.

Chapter VII

Results and Outlook at End of Reign of Selim III

But Sultan Selim's efforts, defeated as they were by the reactionary forces of the empire, were not without results. The rebels who deposed him put his conservative cousin Mustapha on the throne; however, Mustapha's rule was short-lived. There was a truce with Russia, and Bairactar, Pasha of Rustchuk, marched to the capital to restore Selim. But Selim was murdered by one of Mustapha's eunuchs. However another cousin, Mahmud II, who had equal foresight and even greater ability than Selim, was placed on the throne; and his character and firmness allowed him in the course of time, to carry out many of Selim's reforms.

The reforms of Selim III paved the way for his successors, and a new era was opened. It is true that Turkey has since then suffered many defeats and revolts, she has lost armies, fleets, and provinces, but a new spirit has been shown by her rulers and statesmen, which, though it has often been seriously checked, yet has never been entirely extinguished. Turkey has proven false the confident prediction of Volney,¹ Eton² and other writers at the close of the eighteenth century, that her power, at least in Europe, was soon to be completely wiped out.

1. "The sultan equally affected with the same ignorance as his people, will continue to vegetate in his palace; women and eunuchs will continue to appoint to offices and places; and governments will be publicly offered to sale. The pashas will pillage the subjects, and impoverish the provinces. The divan will follow its maxims of haughtiness and intolerance. The

The independence of certain governors continued and increased, and one by one, during the next century, various of the nationalities broke away from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman power. But much was accomplished during the nineteenth century. Feudalism was completely wiped out; Mahmud finally destroyed the janizaries, and an army drilled and generalised according to western ideas has been built up; the artillery and fortifications have been modernized; the financial administration has been reorganized, and general education has been encouraged, with the result of very greatly improving social and economic conditions. The "sick old man from the East" is not yet gone; Turkey still maintains a foot-hold in Europe and is still to be reckoned with among the powers.

1. (Continued) people will be instigated by fanaticism. The generals will carry on war without intelligence, and continue to lose battles, until this incoherent edifice of power, shaken to its basis, deprived of its support, and losing its equilibrium, shall fall, and astonish the world with another instance of mighty ruin."

--Quoted from Volney by Thornton: Present State, II, p. 103

2. "That Turkey must very soon be overwhelmed by the empress, appears from a comparison of her financial resources, her army and her marine, with those of the Ottoman power. Constantinople itself cannot be considered as a tenable post, and when the disaffection of the enslaved Greeks is taken into the account, little doubt can be maintained that the followers of Mohammed will be entirely driven from the countries in Europe which they have usurped, whether England consent or not. . . . It is scarcely to be doubted that another war, conducted on similar principles (like those that ended in 1774 and 1792), must totally extinguish the Turkish power from Europe.

--Eton: Survey, p. 422 and p. 187.

(Written 1795 or 1796.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources

Ahmed Emin,
 "The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by
 its Press "
 New York
 1914
 "An attempt to give a view of Turkey in her strug-
 gle for survival and for betterment."

Baker, James,
 "Turkey in Europe "
 London
 1877

The author was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Crimean War and thus became interested in Turkey. He travelled on horse-back 1,000 miles through the country and made a careful and critical study of all the Turkish institutions and customs. This book is very valuable and contains some material for this period.

Clarke, E. D.,
 "Travels"
 London, 1817--1818
 Part I Vol. II
 Part 2 Sect. I Vol. III
 Part 2 Sect. 3 Vol. VIII

The author was a traveller, antiquary, and mineralogist, and his volumes contain mostly comments on plants, stones, etc.; but they also contain a few valuable paragraphs on customs and events.

Eliot, Sir Charles,
 "Turkey in Europe "
 London
 1908

A valuable book on modern Turkey, which does not contain much that relates to this period.

Eton, W.,
 "Survey of the Turkish Empire "
 London
 1801

This book contains valuable detailed information, but is inclined to be prejudiced against Turkey in any matter in which Russia is in any way con-

Eton, W., (Continued)

cerned. The title page calls the book, "A Survey of the Turkish Empire, in which are considered: I. Its government, finances, military and naval force, religion, history, arts, sciences, manners, commerce, and population. II. The state of the provinces including the subjection of the Greeks, their efforts toward emancipation. . . III. The causes of the decline of Turkey, and those which tend to the prolongation of its existence with a development of the political system of the late empress of Russia. IV. The British commerce with Russia, etc.-- By W. Eton, many years a resident in Turkey and in Russia." In the preface he says: "I reason only from facts. . . . and I speak of countries in which I have been long resident, and events to many of which I have been witness. . . . In Turkey I have been consul; I have had indirect concerns in trade; and as a traveller I have visited most parts of the Empire."

Hamlin, Cyrus,
"Among the Turks"
New York
1877

The author was an American missionary and teacher in Turkey--the first president of Robert College. The book contains a little that applies to this period.

Ives, Edward,
"A Journey from Persia to England,"etc.
London
1773

The writer was surgeon in India, and resigned and travelled home overland. He describes many transactions at which he was present, and he was an acute observer.

Porter, Sir James,
"Observations on Religion, Law, etc. of the Turks "
London
1768

This author was a diplomatist and was sent as ambassador to Constantinople in 1746.

Porter, Robert Ker,
"Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, etc."
London
1822

Porter, Robert Ker, (Continued)

The author^{was} a painter and traveller. In 1817 he took a trip south from St. Petersburg into Turkish territory.

Thornton, Thomas,

"Present State of Turkey"

London

1809

Two Volumes

Title page--"The Present State of Turkey or a description of the political, civil, and religious, constitution, government and laws of the Ottoman Empire; the finances, military, and naval establishments; the state of learning and of the liberal and mechanical arts; the manners and domestic economy of the Turks and other subjects of the grand seignor; etc. etc., together with the geographical, political and civil state of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia--from observations made, during a residence of fifteen years in Constantinople and the Turkish provinces"

The author is familiar with prominent writers on the subject and disagrees with a great many of their statements, especially with those of Mr. Eton, "Thornton possessed an intimate knowledge of his subject, both from his long residence at Constantinople, and from his friendship with the European ambassadors. His work is a valuable contemporary study of the Ottoman Empire."

--Dictionary of National Biography.

Walpole, Robert,

"Memoirs Relating to Turkey"

London

1818

"Travels in Various Countries of the East."

London

1820

Journals, letters, or detached essays--"Remarks as presented to the mind on the spot and subjects supplemented by reading, etc."

The book seems to be a collection of various and unrelated extracts taken from the author's own observations and from the journals, letters, etc. of other travellers.

-----"Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832"

--by an American.

New York
1833

Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji,
Translation in
Holland, T. E.

"The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey"
London
1877

SECONDARY

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed.

Cambridge, 1911

Article, "Turkey"

Vol. XXVII, pp. 426--467

Cambridge Modern History

Chapter on "Continental System," by J. H. Rose

Vol. IX, pp. 385--389

Barton, James L.,

"Daybreak in Turkey"

Boston

1908

A discussion merely from the standpoint of missionary efforts.

Creasy,

"History of the Ottoman Turks"

England

1854

In two volumes

The author has made a careful study of Von Hammer--also has sought information from Montecuculi, Roe, Von Hammer, D'Ohsson, Thornton, Porter, and others. Von Hammer's long residence in the East and his familiarity with the institutions and habits and literature give value to his work. But the work was not a mere abridgment of Von Hammer. A most valuable secondary history.

Davey, Richard,

"The Sultan and His Subjects"

London,

1897

In two volumes

A vivid description of peoples and places and customs.

Freeman, Edward A.,

"Ottoman Power in Europe"

London

1877

Jorga, N.

"Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches"

Gotha

1913

Volume V

Lane--Poole, Stanley,
 "Story of Turkey"
 New York
 1897

This gives the "main outlines of Turkish history." Clearness and brevity were the author's main considerations. Generally considered the best short history of Turkey in English.

Lybyer, A. H.
 "The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time
 of Suleiman the Magnificent"
 Cambridge
 1913

Miller, Wm.,
 "The Ottoman Empire, 1800--1913"
 Cambridge
 1913

One of a series "intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand the nature of existing political conditions." The work was based on original documents when possible and was the result of many years study on the Eastern question. Deals more with the Balkan States than with Turkey.

Monroe, W. S.,
 "Turkey and the Turks"
 London
 1908

Ranke, Leopold,
 "History of Servia"
 Translated from the German by
 Mrs. Alexander Kerr
 London
 1848

The purpose of the book is to excite the nations of Europe in behalf of the Servians and other Christians who were or had been under Turkish rule. Naturally, therefore, it is prejudiced against Turkey, but it contains much valuable information, especially on the subject of the reception of the reforms of Selim, and the forces that caused his overthrow.

Fortnightly Review
 "A Study of Reform in Turkey"
 New York
 1897

Vol 67--pp. 639-659

Fortnightly Review (Continued)

This is a rather careful study of nineteenth century reform in Turkey, but it simply mentioned Selim, and really begins with the work of Mahmud.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA



3 0112 086860290